Note: The opinions, ideas, and perspectives shared in this article are that of the speaker, and not of the article's author.
On June 17, 2025, WorldBoston hosted Dr. Kori Schake at the Boston Public Library for a talk on “The Future of NATO and European Security.” Dr. Schake, a senior fellow and the director of the foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute, delivered her remarks just days before the NATO summit in The Hague on June 25. The timing could not have been better—her talk provided much-needed context and offered predictions for what the summit might bring.
Dr. Schake opened with the words of Stan Sloan, who in 1983 noted that the three oldest refrains in the West are: “NATO is in crisis; deterrence is breaking down; and we need new thinking.” These sayings provided a backdrop for Dr. Schake’s comments and insights into a fresher 2025 take on NATO, with three main themes.
First, while not much has changed from Sloan’s time to now – NATO may have been in crisis even then – this moment feels uniquely anxious. That anxiety stems largely from one actor: American President Donald J. Trump. Unlike his predecessors, President Trump does not believe in the liberal international order – a stance evident both in theory and in practice, and shaped by his own personality. For him, NATO is not a solemn commitment among free societies to protect each other; it is a protection racket, where any member failing to spend 2% of its GDP on defense could be left to fend for itself, and this is not an idle threat. President Trump has recently suggested that the United States might withdraw all its troops from Europe if European countries do not increase their defense spending.
Here, Dr. Schake acknowledged that there may be some genuine frustrations and a historical legacy behind these arguments. In 1951, President Dwight Eisenhower, who had also served as NATO’s first Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, stated that while American troops should be stationed in Europe on a long-term basis, this was meant only until Europe’s economies recovered and they could provide for their own defense. At its founding, NATO was not conceived as a standing military alliance; an integrated military command only emerged after North Korea’s invasion of South Korea in 1950. The United States has also used the threat of withdrawing military support as leverage in the past, as in the case of securing Germany’s admission to NATO in 1954.
As Dr. Schake highlights, “When Europeans are fearful for their security, they only feel safe if the United States is involved in the settlement.” This dynamic has also played to America’s benefit, as Dr. Schake stated, “What we wanted is what we got.” While NATO allies may not always do enough for their own defense, Schake argues, no other dominant power in history has enjoyed as much voluntary assistance in maintaining an international order that keeps it safe and prosperous as the United States has.
Second, while NATO may have needed new thinking in the past, new thinking is precisely what NATO does, adapting to survive. While anxieties were high around the summit, NATO allies did not cancel or cave; they adapted, crafting an outcome the Americans could embrace. Dr. Schake used the example of the 5% defense spending goal to illustrate this. For President Trump, the spending goal was a symbol, a flashy number. But internally, NATO had concluded that 3.5% of GDP was the required figure to carry out its defense plans. The remaining 1.5% was added to reach the “magic” 5% by including infrastructure projects—like repaving the Autobahn—that governments were planning to fund anyway.
NATO knew President Trump would not read the fine print, nor would there be any likely follow through. NATO has 75 years of experience managing a difficult ally and understands that the best way to navigate these moments is to buy time, letting events play out in a more advantageous way. This was not the first time such pragmatic adaptation was on display. Dr. Schake pointed to the Suez Crisis of the 1950s as an earlier example of NATO’s “superpower” where the member states of the alliance found a formula that everyone could agree on to muddle through, together.
Third, while deterrence may have been seen as breaking down, today it is the enduring value of alliances within free societies that proves crucial. In Dr. Schake’s view, what has made NATO so enduring is that neither the United States nor its allies have a better alternative to each other. The past 75 years have not always been stable, with American and European politicians constantly balancing domestic politics with NATO commitments, but NATO has remained. “It is always difficult,” Schake noted, “because everyone has domestic politics, everyone has more than one priority, and everyone is worried they will be abandoned. That’s the nature of alliance relations among free societies: you can’t make each other do anything. You have to win the argument…and that is what makes NATO so enduring.” Schake then stated: “When we are scared, we don’t want to be scared alone. We want to be scared in the company of our closest friends, and that’s what NATO gives the United States as much as it gives our European allies.”
There is a popular belief that democracies don’t go to war with each other, with the lone odd case often cited being Britain and Iceland’s so-called “Cod Wars” over fishing rights in the 1950s and 1970s. But even there, Iceland had no military, and Britain ultimately let them win. This, Dr. Schake argued, is what free societies do—they avoid wringing out every ounce of leverage in a dispute, choosing instead to find outcomes that work for everyone. This is NATO’s quiet genius, and it is why the alliance has endured moments of crisis, times when deterrence felt shaky and new thinking was desperately needed.
Today, these 32 free nations—with caveats around Turkey and Hungary—continue to work together, muddling through challenges and buying time when needed. They navigate disagreements within the alliance the same way democracies handle disagreements at home—by finding ways to live with one another, because the alternative to cooperation is far worse.
In the Q&A, Dr. Schake addressed questions that brought NATO’s evolving challenges into sharp focus. On defense production, she noted the significant shortfalls in both Europe and the United States, emphasizing the need for a coordinated transatlantic strategy to expand production capacity while navigating intra-alliance tensions, such as French efforts to exclude the U.S. and German concerns about that approach. On drones, she described how cheap quadcopters and persistent surveillance have collapsed battlefield mobility, creating a World War I-like environment where movement invites precision strikes. She highlighted the challenge and opportunity of civil-military
fusion, as seen in Ukraine, and how democracies must rethink how to leverage the strengths of civil society and technology without undermining their values.
Turning to NATO expansion, Dr. Schake argued that it did not provoke Russia’s invasions of Ukraine but instead strengthened European security, and she strongly supported admitting Ukraine into NATO once the war ends, noting Ukraine’s proven military capability. She discussed how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shifted public attitudes in neutral countries like Finland and Japan, reinforcing the perception that U.S.-backed alliances remain the surest guarantee of security. Addressing concerns about NATO pausing expansion to accommodate U.S. politics, she explained that stalling to build consensus is a routine part of alliance management, as seen throughout NATO’s history. On Greenland, she criticized the U.S. decision to move it from European Command to Northern Command, calling it an unnecessary slight to Denmark, a steadfast NATO ally. Finally, reflecting on the Trump administration’s approach to Russia, Dr. Schake described it as a chaotic mix of personal affinity for strongmen and poor strategic execution, warning that a spheres-of-influence worldview is a “bad bargain” that undercuts American and allied interests.
Throughout the discussion, Dr. Schake returned to her core argument: While NATO faces real pressures, its capacity to adapt, its democratic character, and its enduring value as an alliance of free societies remain its greatest strengths. In her view, NATO will outlive everyone that was in the room for this event for two reasons. First, because NATO excels at finding compromises that can carry the
alliance forward—something free societies are particularly good at. And second, because free societies don’t really fight each other, and when fear rises, one feels safest in the company of other free societies.
